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JUDICIAL LAW MAKING AND ADMINISTRATION 
Roger C. Cramton, Cornell Law School 
Seventy years ago in St. Paul, Roscoe Pound 
gave a famous speech on "The Causes of Popular 
Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Jus- 
tice." Recently, a prestigious group of lawyers and 
judges, assembled by Chief Justice Burger, recon- 
vened in St. Paul to reconsider Pound's theme. A 
surprising conclusion was that, although the pro- 
fessionals - the lawyers and judges themselves - 
have many problems with the administration of 
justice, the tide of popular dissatisfaction is at a 
relatively low ebb. 
In contrast to other agencies of the govern- 
ment, the people have confidence in the fairness 
and integrity of the courts. True, there is continu- 
ing complaint over the law's cost and delay. But, 
apart from this perennial complaint, popular dis- 
satisfaction appears to stem from two perceptions: 
first, that decisions in criminal cases turn too 
often upon procedural technicalities rather than 
upon the guilt or innocence of the offender; and 
second, that some judges, and especially the fed- 
eral judiciary, have been too actively engaged in 
lawmaking on social and economic issues that are 
better handled by other institutions of govern- 
ment. The layman, on scanning his newspaper or 
viewing the television screen, discovers to his 
surprise that judges are running schools and prison 
systems, prescribing curricula, formulating bud- 
gets, and regulating the environment. 
Causation is a tricky matter. A student theme 
has reported that, since Smokey the Bear posters 
were displayed in the New York subways, forest 
fires have disappeared in Manhattan. Despite the 
risks, I hazard the generalization that several 
fundamental changes in the nature of our society 
may have altered the role of the judiciary. 
Foremost among those changes is that sug- 
gested by the title of this article. The Leviathan is 
upon us, and it has implications for all branches 
of government, including the judiciary. Govern- 
ment now attempts so much! Every technical, 
economic, and social issue seems to end up in the 
hands of government; and the demand for further 
government action is combined with charges that 
existing government is inefficient, heavy-handed, 
and ineffective. This is one field in which the 
appetite for nostrums does not fade with the dem- 
onstrated failure of prior cures. Each reformer, 
after criticizing the failure and inefficiency of 
government, then concludes that the remedy is - 
more of the same! 
But our attitudes about ourselves and about 
conflict have also changed. The confrontational 
style of contemporary America assures that social 
conflict will increase. "Doing your own thing" is 
the central value of a hedonistic, self-regarding 
society; and patience is a nearly extinct virtue. 
Nowadays no one takes "no" for an answer, 
whether it is a job aspirant or a welfare claimant or 
a teacher who has been denied tenure. We perceive 
our society as having grown old; the enthusiastic 
and venturesome spirit that prompted the un- 
charted growth of the American past is now suffer- 
ing from hardening of the arteries. As we experi- 
ence slower economic development and approach 
zero population growth, organized groups contend 
with each other with increasing ferocity for larger 
shares of a more static pie. There is a declining 
sense of a common purpose; the prevailing attitude 
is "what's in it for me?" 
These trends give lawyers and judges an even 
more central role in our society than they have 
had in the past. The decline of moral consensus 
and of institutions of less formal control, such as 
the family and the church, places much more 
strain on the law as an instrument of conflict 
resolution and social control. And the increasing 
contentiousness of groups organized for their 
own advantage has made conflict resolution a 
growth industry. If you could buy stock in law 
firms, I would advise you to do so. Lawyers have a 
legal monopoly on the conflict resolution industry, 
and it is the boom industry of today. 
To these developments - the increasing reliance 
on law as an instrument of social control and the 
rapid growth of group conflict - must be added 
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another factor: the failure of the executive and the 
legislature to meet the challenge of today's in- 
flated expectations. The public perception that 
these branches of government have failed - a per- 
ception greatly abetted by the debacles of Viet- 
nam and Watergate - has led the people to turn 
increasingly to the courts for solutions to their 
problems. 
Models of Judicial Review 
Consider in the context of the Leviathan State 
two models of judicial review of administrative 
action. The traditional model is one of a restrained 
and sober second look at what government has 
done that adversely affects a citizen. The contro- 
versy is bipolar in character, with two parties op- 
posing each other; the issues are narrow and well- 
defined; and the relief is limited and obvious. Has 
a welfare recipient been denied a benefit to which 
he is entitled by statute? Was fair procedure em- 
ployed by the agency? Were constitutional rights 
violated? 
Judicial review in this model serves as a window 
on the outside world, a societal escape valve which 
tests the self-interest and narrow vision of the 
specialist and the bureaucrat against the broader 
premises of the total society. Every bureaucracy 
develops its own way of looking at things and 
these belief patterns are enormously resistant to 
change. In time an agency acquires a tunnel vision 
in which particular values are advanced and others 
are ignored. An independent judiciary tests agency 
outcomes against the statutory framework and the 
broader legal context. 
Judicial review in this form is an absolute essen- 
tial, especially in a society in which the points of 
contact between officials and private individuals 
multiply at every point. The impartial and objec- 
tive second look adds to the integrity and accep- 
tance of the administrative process rather than 
undermining it. If the administrator is upheld, as 
usually is the case, citizen confidence in the fair- 
ness and rationality of administration is enhanced. 
In the relatively small number of cases in which 
the administrator is reversed, the administrator is 
forced to readjust his narrower view to the larger 
perspective of the total society. 
During the last 20 years the pace of constitu- 
tional change, especially in judicial review of gov- 
ernment action, has been astounding. The values 
implicit in general constitutional provisions such 
as due process, equal protection, and free speech 
have been given expanded content and new life. 
Even more important, constitutional rights have 
been extended to persons who were formerly 
neglected by the legal system - blacks, aliens, 
prisoners, and others. One can disagree with the 
merits of particular decisions. But the general 
trends - implementation of fundamental values 
by the courts and the inclusion of previously ex- 
cluded groups in the application of these values - 
constitute a great hour in the long struggle for 
human freedom. 
There is, however, a second model of judicial 
review that is growing in acceptance and authority. 
This model of the judicial role has characteristics 
more of general problem-solving than of dispute 
resolution. Simon Rifkind speaks of a modern 
tendency to view courts as modern handymen - 
as jacks of all trades available to furnish the answer 
to whatever may trouble us. "What is life? When 
does death begin? How should we operate prisons 
and hospitals? Shall we build nuclear power plants, 
and if so, where? Shall the Concorde fly to our 
shores?"' 
Thoughtful observers believe that controversies 
of this character strain the capacities of our courts 
and may have debilitating effects on the self- 
reliance of administrators and legislators. At the 
risk of appearing more reactionary than I am, let 
me focus not on the achievements of the past but 
on the possible dangers that arise when the ju- 
diciary succumbs to pressures to attempt too 
much. 
The Court as Administrator 
The traditional judicial role, earlier described, 
envisions a lawsuit which is bipolar in character, 
seeks traditional relief (usually damages), and 
applies established law to a relatively narrow 
factual situation. The relief given is backward- 
looking and does not order government officials 
to take positive steps in the future. 
The traditional model still persists in much pri- 
vate litigation and in many routine cases challeng- 
ing official action, but in many other constitu- 
tional and statutory controversies radical changes 
have occurred. The changes have led Abram 
Chayes to argue that the basic character of public 
litigation has changed.2 In today's public litiga- 
tion, a federal judge often is dealing with issues 
involving numerous parties; indeed, everyone in 
the community may be affected. Moreover, the 
issues are complex, interrelated, and multi-faceted; 
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and they turn less on proof concerning past mis- 
conduct than on complex predictions as to how 
various social interests should be protected in the 
future. Since the remedy is not limited to compen- 
sating named plaintiffs for a past harm, the judge 
gets drawn, for example, into coercing school 
officials to close schools, bus pupils, change curri- 
cula, and build new facilities. The federal judge be- 
comes one of the most powerful persons in the 
community; on the particular issue, he is the one 
who decides. 
Consider the role of one man, Frank Johnson, 
in the governance of the once sovereign State of 
Alabama. Johnson, a distinguished United States 
District Judge in Alabama, is supervising the 
operation of the prisons, mental hospitals, high- 
way patrol, and other institutions of the state. 
His decrees have directed the state to hire more 
wardens with better training, rebuild the prisons, 
and even extend to such details as the length of 
exercise periods and the installation of partitions 
in the men's rooms. 
What is the authority of a federal judge to take 
such far-reaching actions? Why isn't the Alabama 
legislature the proper body to determine what 
prison or hospital care should be provided, and at 
what cost, through agencies administered by the 
state's executive branch? The answer is that all 
of these actions are designed to remedy violations 
of the constitutional rights of prisoners, mental 
patients, and others. And the Alabama legislature 
and executive have defaulted on their obligation 
to remedy these violations. 
We are caught on the horns of a terrible di- 
lemma. It is unconscionable that a federal court 
should refuse to entertain claims that state offi- 
cials have systematically violated the constitu- 
tional rights of prisoners, mental patients, or 
school children. On the other hand, the design of 
effective relief may draw the court into a continu- 
ing role as an administrator of complex bureau- 
cratic institutions. The dangers of the latter choice 
are worth brief exploration. 
First, the judge who assumes an administrative 
role may gradually lose his neutrality, becoming 
a partisan who is pursuing his own cause. In one 
recent class action, a federal judge not only ap- 
pointed expert witnesses, suggested areas of in- 
quiry, and took over from the parties a substantial 
degree of the management of the case, but also 
went so far as to order that $250,000 from an 
award required of the defendants be paid for social 
science research on the effectiveness of the decree. 
That may be good government, but is it judicial 
justice? 
A further problem arises from the tentativeness 
of our knowledge about such matters as minimum 
standards in operating a prison or mental hospital. 
We fervently hope that civilized and humane 
treatment will be provided to all of those who are 
confined to public institutions. But is it desirable 
to take the view of the current generation of ex- 
perts, especially those self-selected by the plain- 
tiffs or the judge, and to give their views of accept- 
able standards the status of constitutional require- 
ments, with all that implies concerning their fixed 
meaning and difficulty of change? 
Here as elsewhere, our capacity to anticipate 
the future or to discern all relevant facets of poly- 
centric problems is limited. Thus, for example, 
when a federal judge ordered New York City to 
close the Tombs as a city jail or to rebuild it, the 
City, faced with an extraordinary financial crisis, 
opted to close it and prisoners confined to the 
Tombs were transferred to Riker's Island. The 
crowded conditions of the Tombs were immedi- 
ately duplicated on Riker's Island. But a further 
result was not anticipated: Riker's Island is much 
less accessible to the families and attorneys of 
prisoners; and there is reason to believe that the 
vast majority of prisoners prefer the convenience 
of the Tombs, despite its problems, to the in- 
accessibility of Riker's Island. 
The underlying truth is that court orders can- 
not by judicial decree achieve social change in 
the face of the concerted opposition of elected 
officials and public opinion. In a representative 
democracy, the consent of the people is required 
for lasting change. 
The impulse to reform, moreover, is not limited 
to courts nor to constitutional law. A vigilant 
press, an informed populace, and the leadership of 
a committed minority have mobilized forces of 
change and reform throughout our history. A rep- 
resentative democracy may move slowly, but if 
we lack patience we may undermine the self- 
reliance and responsibility of the people and their 
elected officials. 
The danger of confrontation between branches 
of government is yet another concern. What hap- 
pens, for example, if Alabama refuses to fund its 
mental hospitals or prisons at the level required 
to achieve the standards specified in Judge John- 
son's decrees? The next step, Judge Johnson has 
said, is the sale of Alabama's public lands in order 
to finance, through court-appointed officers, the 
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necessary changes. 
A degree of tension is a necessary concomitant 
of the checks and balances of a federal system. 
But in our urge to check we should not forget that 
balance is involved as well. One of the lessons of 
the Watergate era is that cooperation, restraint, 
and patience among the various branches and 
levels of government is necessary if our system is 
to survive in the long run. As Ben Franklin said 
many years ago, we must hang together or we will 
hang separately. 
Pressures for Judicial Action 
Why have the courts undertaken these more ex- 
pansive functions? They have not done so as vol- 
unteers desirous of expanding their own powers, 
but reluctantly and hesitantly in response to pub- 
lic demands for effective implementation of gen- 
erally held values. 
The American people today have little patience 
or restraint in dealing with social issues. An instant 
problem requires an instant solution that provides 
instant gratification. Playing this game under those 
rules, the executive and legislature have done their 
best - grinding out thousands of laws and regula- 
tions, many of them ineffective and some of them 
intrusive and harmful. The public, while demand- 
ing even more action from legislators and adminis- 
trators, perceives these bodies as inept, ineffective, 
and even corrupt. Moreover, issues on which there 
is a deep social division, such as school busing or 
abortion, are avoided by elected officials, who 
view them as involving unacceptable political risks. 
Nature abhors a vacuum and the inaction of the 
executive and lawmaking branches creates pres- 
sures for judicial action. A prominent federal judge 
put it succinctly at the recent St. Paul conference: 
"If there is a serious problem, and the legislature 
and executive don't respond, the courts have to 
act." 
And they have done so on one after another 
burning issue. The mystery is that they have been 
so successful and that there has been so little 
popular outcry. The desegregation of Southern 
schools, of course, is a success story of heroic 
proportions. Legislative reapportionment is also 
generally viewed as a success despite the mathe- 
matical extreme to which it was carried in its later 
years. Organs of opinion, especially the TV net- 
works and major newspapers, support the Court's 
actions in general and especially in such areas as 
civil rights and criminal procedure. There is no 
institution in our society that has as good a press 
as the Supreme Court. Judicial activism, it appears, 
has the approval of the intellectual elite who have 
become disillusioned with the effectiveness of 
social change by other means. It is more doubtful, 
however, whether the common man concurs either 
in the elite's support of judicial lawmaking or of 
its substantive results. 
Long-Term Effects 
Neither popular acclaim nor criticism, of 
course, can answer the long-term question of the 
appropriate lawmaking role of the judiciary and 
the desirable limits on the scope of judicial de- 
crees. More fundamental considerations must be 
decisive. 
First, the practical question of comparative 
qualifications. Do judges, by training, selection, or 
experience, have an aptitude for social problem 
solving that other officials of government lack? 
And are the techniques of adjudication well de- 
signed to perform these broader policy-making 
functions? Professor Abram Chayes of the Harvard 
Law School has answered these questions with a 
confident affirmative.3 I am inclined to disagree. 
Second, what will be the long-term effects of 
this trend on the credibility of the courts and on 
the sense of responsibility of administrators and 
legislators? 
After completion of this article, my fears on 
this score received support from an unlikely source 
- Anthony Lewis in the New York Times. After 
acknowledging, as I do, that the Boston School 
Case "presented exceptional difficulties," that "a 
judge could [not] in conscience remit the com- 
plaining black families to their political remedy," 
and that District Judge Garrity's lonely efforts 
should be viewed with sympathy, Lewis neverthe- 
less concludes that Garrity's involvement in the 
day-by-day administration of school affairs "has 
not worked well" and "is a serious philosophical 
error:" 
American judges have to handle many controversial prob- 
lems with political implications - redistricting, prisons 
and the like. Their object should always be to nudge 
elected officials into performing their responsibility. 
[Excessive intervention by the judge] tends to take 
responsibility away from those who ought to be seen to 
bear it4 
And finally, as Simon Rifkind has put it, there 
is "the ancient question, quo warranto? By what 
authority do judges turn courts into mini-legis- 
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latures?"5 
The critical question in a republic is how gov- 
ernment by nonelected, lifetime officials can be 
squared with representative democracy. The magic 
of the robe, the remnants of the myth that law on 
these matters is discovered by an elaboration of 
existing rules (rather than by personal preference), 
and the prudence of the judiciary in picking 
issues on which it could command a great deal of 
popular support - perhaps these factors explain 
why the judges have been as successful as they 
have. 
I fear, however, that the judiciary has exhaust- 
ed the areas where broad majoritarian support will 
sustain new initiatives and that the tolerance of 
local communities for "government by decree" is 
fast dissipating. If so, caution is in order lest a 
depreciation of the esteem in which we hold the 
courts undermines their performance of the essen- 
tial tasks that are indisputably theirs and that 
other institutions cannot perform. 
The authority of the courts depends in large 
part on the public perception that judges are 
different from other policy makers. Judges (but 
not elected officials) are impartial rather than 
willful or partisan; judges utilize special decisional 
procedures; and they draw on established general 
principles in deciding individual cases. In short, 
traditional ideas concerning the nature, form, and 
functions of adjudication as a decisional technique 
1 Simon H. Rifkind, "Are We Asking Too Much of Our 
Courts?" paper prepared for the National Conference 
on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Ad- 
ministration of Justice, St. Paul, Minn., April 8, 1976, 
p. 5. 
underlie popular acceptance of judicial outcomes. 
While the precise boundaries of the adjudicative 
technique are flexible rather than fixed, if they 
are abandoned entirely the judge loses credibility 
as a judge. He becomes merely another policy 
maker who, in managing prisons or schools or 
whatnot, is expressing his personal views and 
throwing his weight around. When that point is 
reached, the judge's credibility and authority is no 
greater than that of Mayor White in Boston or 
Mayor Rizzo in Philadelphia. 
With the credibility of the legislature and 
executive branches of government in such dis- 
repair, we cannot afford any further depreciation 
in the judicial currency. General acceptance of 
the authority of law is a necessary bulwark of our 
otherwise fragile social order. If it disappears, the 
resulting collapse of order may put the American 
people in the mood for that "more effective man- 
agement" which is likely to characterize any dis- 
tinctly American brand of authoritarianism. 
Opportunities for charismatic and authoritarian 
leadership, it has been said, derive in considerable 
measure from the ability to "accentuate [a so- 
ciety's] sense of being in a desperate predica- 
ment." If the courts, by overextension and conse- 
quent failure, contribute to our growing sense of 
desperation, our liberties may not long survive. 
When a people despair of their institutions, force 
arrives under the masquerade of ideology. 
Votes 
2. Abram Chayes, "The Role of the Judiciary in a Public 
Law System," Harvard Law Review (May 1976). 
3. Op. cit. n. 2, supra. 
4. New York Times, May 24, 1976, p. 29. 
5. Rifkind, op. cit. n. 1, supra, p. 20. 
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